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Organizational Inscriptions of Network Pictures:  
A Meso-Level Analysis 
 
Abstract 
This paper deals with manifestations of managerial cognition, thus elaborating on a 
neglected area in business networks and management. While previous studies have 
concentrated on business networks from entire companies’ or individual persons’ 
perspective, this paper operates on a focal company level (meso-level) and is concerned 
with how interactive sense-making is represented in organizational artifacts, which in 
turn aim to guide organizational activities. The paper develops and tests a dimensional 
model of tangible traces of organizational network pictures, which thereby becomes a 
means to capture managers’ interactive sense-making of a company’s network. We found 
manifestation of managerial cognition in the following areas: systems, processes, 
budgets, strategy, and organization, which in turn influenced the inclusion/exclusion of 
interaction partners, the interaction mode, and resource allocation.  
 
Keywords 
Manifestation, Organizational Traces, Managerial Cognition, Network Pictures, Meso-
level 
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Organizational Inscriptions of Network Pictures:  
A Meso-Level Analysis 
 
Introduction 
This study takes its motivation from a neglected area in business networks and 
management - the manifestations of managerial cognition. The study operates at the level 
of a focal company and is concerned with understanding how interactive sense-making is 
represented in organizational artifacts such as processes, structures, or managerial rules 
and principles within the company. ‘Organizational network pictures’ which are 
indicative of an amalgamation of the individual views of involved managers provide a 
useful platform to investigate how the company sees itself within its surrounding business 
network (Mouzas, Henneberg & Naudé, 2008); they also provide a valuable basis to 
investigate companies’ networking (Ritter, 1999). Manifestations of such network 
pictures represent tangible traces within the organizations and thus guide an 
understanding for underlying network pictures, and also aim to guide the companies’ 
networking activities. Hence, our study tries to advance the analysis of business networks 
through a better understanding of organizationally inscribed managerial cognition that 
directs managerial activities of a company (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985). For this purpose, 
we analyze a company case study, covering managerial and network dynamics over time, 
to develop a dimensional model of organizational network pictures. 
The extant literature on business marketing has developed concepts such as the activity-
resource-actor model (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995) to grasp network constellations and 
the underlying business and interaction logic which describes them. Research on strategy 
has also introduced strategic groups to identify business market constellations 
(Athanassopoulos, 2003; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994). Previous research in 
organizational behavior has addressed the issue of managerial cognition by examining the 
cognitive maps managers use to comprehend their choices, options and anticipated 
consequences of strategic activities. Similarly, business marketing theories employ 
network picture methodologies to understand the subjective understanding of networks 
on which individual managers build their networking activities (Ford et al. 2003; Ford & 
Redwood, 2005; Henneberg, Mouzas & Naudé, 2006; Ford & Ramos, 2007). The 
limitation of previous research, however, is that it relies on subjective views and that it 
does not make use of tangible organizational inscriptions at a company level. Studies at 
this level (i.e. a focal company and its inscribed network representations) have been 
recently identified by Henneberg, Naudé, and Mouzas (2010) as an important aspect of 
the development of research on sense-making and cognition in business networks.  
Companies are embedded in a complex system of exchanges and interactions with 
suppliers, customers, competitors, regulators, and other third parties (Achrol, 1997; 
Achrol & Kotler, 1999; Parolini, 1999). While some of these exchanges or interactions 
are more important to a focal company than others, the managerial activities any 
organization uses are contingent on the actions, reactions, and perceptions of other actors 
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in such business networks (Ford & Håkansson, 2006). It is of pivotal importance for the 
success of any company that its managers have an appropriate understanding of these 
contingent relationships within their exchange network. The challenge we address in this 
study relates to the fact that the interactions and relationships of a company cannot be 
fully understood simply by referring to subjective belief systems of managers (i.e. 
network pictures), nor can a systemic understanding of the overall network complexities 
explain the deterministic character of strategic actions. The proposed dimensional model 
of organizational network pictures, therefore, contributes to an alternative approach, 
operating on the meso-level of a focal company within a network, to investigate business 
markets. 
In the following, we provide an overview of existing concepts and methods used to 
investigate business markets. By doing so, we argue for the importance of the meso-level. 
Following on from this, we will introduce the rationale for understanding organizational 
network inscriptions. We will then introduce our case study, from which we will 
subsequently derive a conceptual discussion of the dimensional model by elaborating on 
the essence (i.e. dimensions) of organizational network pictures as found in our case 
research. This will lead us to a full description of the traces left by subjective network 
pictures via the manifold interactions of managerial practice in different areas of the case 
company. Finally, we will synthesize the findings, and relate our new dimensional model 
to research in the area of business markets. 
Understanding Business Markets 
Approaches to understanding business markets have been developed in different fields of 
research, e.g. strategy as well as marketing. Generally, one can distinguish three different 
levels regarding theories and concepts relating to business markets. On a micro-level, 
individual managers within an organization are the focal point of analysis. Their 
understanding of how a company is embedded in interactions and relationships with other 
actors in the network forms the methodological anchor to research business markets. In 
this view networks are individually constructed by managers. Diametrically opposed to 
such a perspective is the classical network approach. Here the structures on macro-level 
serve as the unit of analysis, i.e. business markets are understood as systems in which 
individual managers or companies are mere contributing agents. Such a research view 
tries to overcome the subjectivity of the micro-level by providing a synthesized 
understanding of networks as integratively constructed by researchers. Thus, no objective 
network exists but the network construct is based on the analytical perspective of the 
researcher (and the network models used to facilitate such a perspective). 
We propose that these two dominant approaches to understanding business markets can 
be complemented through a perspective of networks as socially constructed by the 
interactions between managers. By this we refer to the meso-level of an organizational 
entity, e.g. a company within a business network. While companies, in contrast with 
individual managers, do not hold ‘network views’ and do not ‘network’ (this would result 
in the fallacy of reification of the company) (Meindl, Stubbart & Porac, 1994), traces can 
nevertheless be found in the organization which help make sense of the constituting 
characteristics of the embedding network as experienced by the entirety of the relevant 
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individuals within the company. These traces are the manifestations of interpersonal 
interactions and decisions within the company which amalgamate the different micro-
level beliefs regarding the business network (Mouzas et al., 2008). While we will 
introduce existing concepts relating to these levels of understanding business networks, 
our proposed dimensional model of organizational pictures will provide an initial attempt 
to operationalize our approach at the meso-level. 
Micro-understanding of Business Markets 
Understanding the subjective construction of the business environment through the sense-
making of individual managers represents an area of research which has recently attracted 
considerable interest within marketing theory (Ford et al., 2003) and beyond (Smircich & 
Stubbart, 1985; Castells, 2000). Three different methodological groups of network 
pictures, cognitive maps, and cognitive strategic groups can be distinguished.  
The construct of network pictures is used to conceptualize the process of individual 
sense-making for the understanding of management practices in terms of how 
organizations manage in networks (Borders, Johnston & Rigdon 2001; Holmen & 
Pedersen, 2003). Within the IMP group, the dictum holds that actors such as companies 
cannot ‘manage a network’ but can only ‘manage in networks’ (Ford et al., 2003). 
However, any construct that characterizes such managerial networking activities (which 
includes decision-making and realization of decisions as well as cognitive aspects such as 
gaining an understanding of the network, its actors and interactions; Halinen, Salmi & 
Havila, 1999) is based on subjective cognitive structures, so-called schemata which 
enable ‘sense-making’. Thus, it is assumed that reality is, in a certain way, fundamentally 
mind-dependent. This view, based on Kant’s idealism, serves as a starting point of our 
theoretical discussion (Kant, 1781/1998).  
The resulting network pictures are defined as the mental representations of the network 
characteristics which individual managers perceive as important for their own sense- and 
subsequently decision-making (Ford et al., 2003; Ford & Håkansson, 2006; Henneberg, 
Mouzas & Naudé, 2006), i.e. network pictures are the actors’ ‘network theories’ 
(Johanson & Mattsson, 1992). They encompass beliefs and attitudes which actors hold 
about the complex inter-organizational exchanges and interactions within which their 
management actions are embedded (and which provides opportunities but also 
restrictions for their marketing options). These are subjective and dynamic cognitive 
representations of the network environment and what it ‘means’ for the individual 
managers. What is included in such a network picture and what is not, how aspects of it 
are linked, where ‘boundaries’ are drawn, all these questions are specific to the subjective 
judgment of a manager about what is important (Ford & Ramos, 2006; 2007). Such 
individual importance can be judged to be general or specific, e.g. with regard to context, 
task, or time. Henneberg, Mouzas and Naudé (2006) have shown that different structures 
of network pictures exist, depending on the individual’s overall goal orientation. 
Furthermore, network pictures are more than just pictorial representations of inter-
organizational relationships but are cognitive maps in the sense of multi-layered schemata 
which are based on spacial relations as well as textual connections (Henneberg & 
Rohrmus, 2006; Ford & Ramos, 2006). Recently, the concept of network pictures has 
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been applied to research in business marketing, e.g. to understand changing perceptions 
in merger and acquisition situations (Öberg, Henneberg & Mouzas, 2007), to analyze 
change in networks (Abrahamsen, Naudé & Håkansson, 2007), to compare situational 
contingencies (Ford & Ramos, 2007), or to optimize a business network segmentation 
approach (Henneberg, Mouzas & Naudé, 2009).  
Besides the IMP Group’s research on network pictures as the subjective micro-
understanding of business markets, there exists literature on organizational behavior 
which has proposed similar concepts on micro-level, e.g. research on cognitive maps used 
by managers (Eden, Ackermann & Cropper, 1992; Fiol & Huff, 1992; Hodgkinson, 1997; 
Huff, 1990; Weick, 1990a). Furthermore, issues around organizational sense-making as 
discussed at length by Weick and colleagues are also relevant on this level (Weick, 1979; 
1990b; 1993; 1995; Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick & Roberts, 1993). Another strand of 
research looking at subjective and micro-level analyses is presented in the strategic 
management literature, particularly studies on cognitive strategic groups which analyze 
the perceptions of top managers regarding their business network, particularly their 
perceived competitive environment (Bogner & Thomas, 1993; Bougon, 1992; Bougon, 
Weick & Binkhorst, 1977; Daniels, Johnson & Chernatony, 2002; Lyles & Schwenk, 
1992; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; Porac, Thomas & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Stubbart, 
1989). 
Macro-understanding of Business Networks 
Besides an analysis of network structures from a subjective point of view, i.e. focusing on 
individual managers, there exist research strands which take the network characteristics 
per se as the concept phenomena in question. Within the strategic group literature ‘sub-
markets’ are identified which are competitive network structures (Athanassopoulos, 
2003; Hodgkinson & Johnson, 1994; McNamara, Deephouse & Luce, 2003). These are 
analyzed via an understanding of some of their objective features, e.g. similar capability 
sets and similar ‘rules of engagement’, where they share structural and behavioral 
characteristics (Duysters & Hagedoorn, 1995). Following concepts from industrial 
organization economics, it is assumed that the companies of a strategic group isolate 
themselves competitively from the outside via colluding behavior, by forming a network 
(Bogner & Thomas, 1993; McNamara et al., 2003). While not equivocal, studies of 
performance related to strategic group networks showed that different performance levels 
are associated with strategic group participation (e.g. measured via market share, see 
Cool & Schendel, 1987; or profitability, see Lawless, Bergh & Wilsted, 1989). 
Within the IMP group, networks are also researched on a macro-level. The morphology 
of the network is expressed in the ARA model about the actor ties, activity bonds and 
resource interactions that characterize the interdependent business relationships which 
form network structures (Håkansson & Snehota, 1995). While there exist numerous 
studies which apply this model and provide insights into macro-aspects of the network 
(Anderson, Håkansson & Johanson, 1994; Gadde, 2004), the concept of network pictures 
has also been used tentatively on this level to show longitudinal developments within 
networks, e.g. the work by Ford and Redwood (2005). Their study implies an 
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amalgamation of different network pictures (some of them retrospective ones) to a 
‘researcher’s view’ of the network. 
The Conundrum of the Meso-Level 
Having introduced different concepts to understand business markets, it becomes clear 
that there exists a separation between understanding subjective sense-making schemata 
on the one hand, and market and network phenomena on the other. This is exemplified in 
the theoretical link between network pictures and networking (Ford et al., 2003; Ford & 
Håkansson, 2006). There exists a significant chasm between subjectively-held network 
pictures and organizational activities (‘networking’), i.e. the implementation of 
managerial decisions to interact with customers, suppliers, and other relevant actors 
(Meindl et al., 1994). This transition from network pictures to activities represents an 
epistemological chasm within the cognitive cycle of belief, action, and reaction (learning) 
(Neisser, 1967; 1976). In the complex world of business networks, individual managers 
do not ‘act’ in the sense of strategic networking activities as an ‘expression of their 
enacted will’. Firstly, decision-making is often social, in that it is group-based, as well as 
formalized, by being channeled through due diligence regulations, or rigid decision 
processes or systems. Secondly, the enactment of managerial decisions is frequently 
delegated. Thirdly, marketing and strategic actions in networks depend to some degree on 
other business actors that are part of an inter-organizational relationship such as 
collaborative NPD projects, joint ventures and strategic alliances, and therefore are often 
not single-entity specific. This leaves the conundrum that seemingly whole organizational 
entities such as companies act (they ‘network’). However, their networking activities are 
based on the subjective network pictures of the relevant decision-makers (typically top-
management-teams) (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Networking can therefore be 
understood as an ‘aggregated’ enactment of individual expressions of will and as such 
can be ‘attributed’ to an organization. This is also how it is perceived by other network 
actors: ‘Company X has increased the price for product A’. In fact, most management 
activities affecting organizational interactions are not (and mainly cannot) be attributed to 
individual persons and their underlying subjective way of sense-making, they are 
enmeshed with the structures and processes of an organizational entity within which it is 
enacted (Weick, 1995). However, while networking as a theoretical construct does not 
imply a reification of whole organizations as ‘actors’ (Meindl et al., 1994), it nevertheless 
implies that an ‘objectification’ (in the sense of an inter-subjective alignment or 
organizational manifestation) of mental models or network pictures happens (Mouzas et 
al., 2008). This results in certain activities being enacted, or realized. Therefore, the link 
between (individual) network pictures and (integrated) networking activities takes place 
on the meso-level of the company, through the (social) interactions and decisions of the 
relevant managers. The conceptual transformation of cognitive schemata to network-
relevant business activities presupposes therefore a company-centric manifestation of the 
different managerial network pictures. As such, we posit that certain network pictures can 
be associated with ‘organizations’, in that they are structures or imprints within the 
organizational make-up, processes, or culture of a company that embed a specific view of 
how a company relates to other actors in the network (Porac et al., 1989).  
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In the following, we will call these organizational imprints organizational network 
pictures. The resulting organizational structures are called artifacts or inscriptions, 
indicating that they are the tangible organizational manifestations of the manifold 
subjective network pictures within a company. It is these artifacts or inscriptions that the 
dimensional model of organizational pictures investigates. 
Organizational Network Pictures and Understanding Business Markets 
We have argued that organizational networking is not based solely on the network 
pictures of individual actors but on their social amalgamation into what we posit to be 
organizational network pictures. At this point it is of no importance whether such 
organizational network pictures are dominated by the view of one or several persons, 
whether they are kaleidoscopic, or whether they represent the common denominators 
between all relevant subjective network pictures (Ford et al., 2003). For the purposes of 
our argument, it is only important to state that an ‘objectification’ is happening in the 
sense that through social interactions between managers, an inter-subjective and 
somewhat shared social view is formed (Weick, 1979; 1995).  
It can be expected that these organizational network pictures are not explicit but they 
have formed, often unconsciously, as part of manifold social exchanges. However, they 
leave organizational traces, i.e. inscriptions. Again, these inscriptions which are the 
manifestations of the shared beliefs about the business network do not need to be explicit 
but they are, in line with our characterization of them as artifacts, impressed on many 
different aspects of an organization, especially on those areas that are related to 
interactions with the ‘outside’ (this can include classical marketing interactions with 
customers but also those with suppliers, strategic partners, knowledge providers, or 
competitors). Inscriptions can both be part of an explicit decision (e.g. the strategic 
statement of ‘we see ourselves in strategic competition with companies A and B’), or they 
can be embedded implicitly within managerial decisions that are not primarily linked to 
‘networking’ activities but have an impact on them (such as the decision to cut sales force 
budgets by 50%, resulting in the pruning of sales visits to some customer segments). 
These organizational network pictures represent an objectification that can in turn start an 
ossification process, based on the reinforcing relationship between these manifestations 
and further decisions that impact on the organizational perspective regarding its 
surrounding environment (Porac et al., 1989; Porac, Thomas, Wilson, Paton & Kanfer, 
1995; Daft & Weick, 1984). Consequently, different perceived network elements 
(manifestations and inscriptions) within an overall and mostly complementary 
organizational network picture interlock with each other and eventually influence most 
managerial actions by providing a subtle but stable frame that guides and limits strategic 
decision-making. As such, organizational frameworks are also functioning as ‘sense-
giving’ devices which encourage certain subjective ways of interpreting network 
phenomena. 
In order to understand how companies manage within complex business networks, it is 
therefore important to understand the drivers of their actions as represented in the 
company-wide organizational network pictures. These have a certain normative power 
over the actions of individual managers within a company in terms of networking options 
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and decisions. This is not to say that organizational network pictures cannot be changed 
by individuals. However, such change would again imply a social activity which leaves 
new organizational traces. To understand the macro-level of business markets, we 
therefore also need to understand the meso-level of the organizational network pictures of 
the individual agents within these markets, i.e. the companies. The dimensional model of 
organizational pictures provides a tool to systematically capture such organizational 
inscriptions. 
Empirical Case Study Design 
Before the dimensional model of organizational pictures is derived from the longitudinal 
case study of a leading material-handling equipment manufacturer, the empirical research 
design is described. The case study company, BT Industries (AB Bygg- och 
Transportekonomi), was analyzed with special reference to the time period 1996 to 2004. 
This time period was chosen as it represents several crucial merger and acquisition 
activities (operationalized as four different phases), in which this company was involved, 
which dramatically shifted its understanding of the network in which it was doing 
business (Öberg, 2008).  
Our main empirical sources consist of multiple interviews with twenty-two BT managers 
which were done in 2003 to 2005, ranging from CEO and President, Vice Presidents, 
CFOs, division and country managers, but also district sellers, purchasing and business 
planning managers. These interviews were conducted in the mother-tongue of the 
managers, using semi-open question frames which allowed for clarification, follow-up 
and additional questions to be employed. Furthermore, primary material was used, 
including BT press releases and internal documents.  
Different textual sources were analyzed, using content analysis which was employed by 
overlaying our construct components and variables over the analyzed texts (Hodder, 
1994; Huberman & Miles, 1994; Krippendorff, 2004; Manning & Cullum-Swan, 1994). 
Abductive inferences were used to link our research question and the construct 
operationalization with the different empirical sources (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Using 
reflexive contrast and comparison techniques as well as multi-rater assessments (Altheide 
& Johnson, 1994; Hodder, 1994; Huberman & Miles, 1994) allowed us to reduce the data 
and present our findings as synthesis and juxtaposition tables (Krippendorff, 2004).  
The qualitative assessment of the content analysis was done independently by the 
researchers. Afterwards, themes, ideas, and specific findings were compared by analyzing 
the overlaps as well as discussing the discrepant findings. Specifically, we tested whether 
our findings: 
• were directly or otherwise clearly linked to the cognitive belief systems of top-
managers (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; Lyles & Schwenk, 1992) 
• were presenting an expression of a manifestation of different categories of 
organizational network pictures (items which span several categories were 
analyzed and discussed further to decompose them into their specific components) 
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• were mentioned by more than one researcher as being present in the case study 
material. 
Additionally, an independent academic was provided with the basic description of the 
network pictures concept and the different aspects of their manifestations to verify the 
accuracy of the findings and guard against bias by the researchers. The judge was then 
asked to analyze the textual data for one randomly selected time period and compare 
these findings with the researchers’ results. Proportional reduction in loss (PRL) was used 
to assess inter-judge reliability which was above 0.7, i.e. satisfactory for exploratory 
research (Rust & Cooil, 1994). 
Case Study of Traces of Organizational Network Pictures 
In this case study, the different manifestations of how BT is embedded within a network 
of inter-organizational relationships is discussed. It needs to be mentioned that such a 
discussion does not relate organizational network pictures to individual cognition. 
Although the level of the company is the main descriptive perspective, this represents a 
simplification of the complex interactions between managers which lead to these 
manifestations (Mouzas et al., 2008). Individual network pictures may actually contradict 
organizational ones. Thus, the presentation of our findings on the company level must not 
be misunderstood as a reification of the organization (Meindl et al., 1994). We will use 
the four phases of the development of BT to illustrate our findings, each representing a 
shift in organizational network pictures associated with a major acquisition activity. Thus, 
phase 0 is used as a ‘baseline’. Following on from this, differences in the aspects of 
organizational manifestations of network pictures are discussed in phases 1 to 3. 
Phase 0: BT prior to 1997 
Prior to the hectic acquisition activities beginning in 1997, BT’s organizational network 
pictures were characterized by an understanding of itself as a rather peripheral player in 
the network. BT saw the competitive landscape ‘shrinking’ (fewer competitors but with 
better capabilities; integrated brands). This picture was inscribed in a (marketing) strategy 
which ‘explained’ the value-creating system according to demand differences of key 
downstream players: BT aligned itself with specific customers and their preferences (in 
the consumer goods industry and the transport sector) and in specific areas (particularly 
Europe) with a focus on warehouse trucks. The organizational structure of BT, as well as 
its distribution systems, was a clear manifestation of this position within the network. 
This can be juxtaposed with BT’s understanding of the network competences and 
demands of its customers: these were perceived to want integrated solutions across sub-
networks. BT understood this to mean cross-relational interactions and processes, which 
BT at this point did not match. In this phase, BT focused with its strategy and underlying 
organizational network picture on ‘aspirational’ competitors, such as Linde and 
Jungheinrich, which had in BT’s opinion already achieved more integrated systems and 
processes compared to BT. 
Based on a strategic network picture that saw BT as a services provider within the value-
creating system, the importance of service interactions plus rental interactions is 
expressed by their contributing seventy percent of BT’s turnover. This also became 
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inscribed in the distribution system with many fully-owned or semi-dependent 
distribution and after-sales service channels (contrary to some other market players). 
Processes of customer interaction meant that much focus was placed on service provision 
with the aim to create continuity in customer relationships.  
Aspects of BT’s ownership structure also impacted on some elements of its 
organizational network pictures. The fact that BT had no debts and that liquid resources 
existed, together with strategic profitability aims which were not achievable via organic 
growth, caused BT to perceive the network strategically in line with more ambitious 
aims. A ‘wider’ network picture was evident: new players became interesting 
(competitors or cooperation partners in counterbalanced trucks) as well as new 
interactions (worldwide-offering provision in an integrated, global system). Strategic 
merger and acquisition activities became the only option for BT to enact its ‘wider’ 
network picture, also encouraged by the organizational development of BT becoming 
more of a peripheral business in the portfolio of KF, the investment vehicle that was the 
main owner of BT in this phase. Financial resources were consequently allocated for 
acquiring companies, and some various options regarding geographical or product 
expansion were considered. This also included the process of evaluating individual 
companies as potential targets for acquisitions. 
Phase 1: BT after Raymond acquisition (1997-1999) 
BT in phase 1 shows very different manifestations of its network pictures after the 
acquisition of the US warehouse truck manufacturer Raymond. This take-over allowed 
BT to enact at least partially its network ambition: it now became a global and integrated 
player in the warehouse truck industry. BT now saw itself as the worldwide ‘Number 1’ 
in its sector of the truck market, having become a ‘core actor’ in the value-creating 
system. Changes linked to these new network pictures manifested themselves quickly in 
different aspects of BT’s network pictures.  
In terms of systems, the more central and global position of BT meant that they now had 
an expectation of being used as ‘preferred suppliers’ with the associated key account and 
key supply management processes associated. Thus, a manifestation of all things ‘global’ 
(e.g. International KAM) became visible in the systems architecture of BT as well as in 
the process chains of suppliers (BT and Raymond integrated their purchasing strategy and 
processes with special emphasis on driving costs down). However, while this network 
picture of integration became manifested on BT’s upstream-side of the network, the same 
did not happen for the downstream-side, regarding customer interactions. ‘Old’ network 
picture structures (i.e. pre-Raymond acquisition) were visible: Raymond and BT divided 
customers by ‘continental responsibilities’, based on a network logic which explained 
customer differences (need for ergonomics and quality versus need for price) by 
juxtaposing Europe and the US. This meant that SBU-organization based on regions 
followed, with BT ‘leading’ the European effort, and Raymond being responsible for the 
US operations. Furthermore, combined NPD development between Raymond and BT did 
not succeed, ossifying an intra-organizational network picture of ‘two cultures’. This 
intra-organizational perception was consequently mirrored in BT’s interactions with 
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customers which meant that often buying companies were not made aware of the fact that 
BT and Raymond were now an integrated company.  
Thus, while BT tried to achieve a ‘preferred supplier status’ as a global player in the 
market following from its acquisition of Raymond, the manifestations of organizational 
network pictures show clearly that this ‘vision’ did not become inscribed in BT’s 
processes, systems, nor in its strategy or organization. Budgets also allowed the 
companies to work independently with regards to marketing and sales activities. 
However, BT still had the ‘wider’ strategic network pictures as guidance for further 
activities which was based on seeing the relevant network as the overall global truck 
market and not merely the warehouse truck segment of it. 
Phase 2: BT after Cesab acquisition (1999-2000) 
The acquisition of Cesab can be seen as another step done by BT to enact its ‘wider’ 
organizational network picture. However, the specific targeting of Cesab was a kind of 
afterthought after negotiations with other actors in the market had failed. BT had initially 
aimed to find a partner for cooperation, a result of that BT did not consider itself to have 
the competences to develop counterbalanced trucks itself, but also a consequence of 
budget constraints following the acquisition of Raymond, which had meant that BT did 
not have the financial resources to acquire any large company in the counterbalanced 
truck area. Furthermore, BT was under threat itself as it perceived that its position in the 
network could change dramatically as KF, its owner, was actually thinking about 
disinvesting non-core activities such as BT. 
Nevertheless, BT’s wider network pictures and its manifestation in its strategy focused 
still on global customers demanding a full complement of trucks from one supplier, i.e. 
warehouse and counterbalanced trucks together. Thus, the Cesab acquisition closed a gap 
in BT’s network picture manifestations by providing the capabilities to fulfill these 
demands. This was also driven by BT’s perception, as inscribed in its strategy, that they 
were (again) lacking behind Linde and Jungheinrich (which had become full-offering 
suppliers through the respective acquisitions of STILL and Steinbock).  
The Cesab acquisition changed the network picture manifestations in many different 
ways. Firstly, it reduced the relevant direct cooperation partners for BT (Clark and Hyster 
as previous operational partners in the area of counterbalanced trucks had the respective 
relationships ended). Cesab trucks were produced under BT’s brand. However, the 
organizational structure of diverse but dependent sales and services organizations was 
perpetuated by adding the Cesab sales organization as a further channel. This meant 
additional customer interaction systems as Cesab also relied on independent dealers. 
Customers were still able to buy Cesab and BT trucks in a competitive sales environment 
as the two brands (with their respective channels and interaction systems) were run 
independently, providing customers with perceived alternatives. This meant for BT that 
the company needed to manage network pictures of intra-company competition. Thirdly, 
BT ‘exported’ its supply-chain management best practice to Cesab, using its proven 
processes and systems of buying in the warehouse truck market also for its 
 13 
counterbalanced trucks, with the aim to reduce costs for the counterbalanced truck 
manufacturing. 
Phase 3: BT after take-over by Toyota (2000-2004) 
With phase 2, BT had to some extent been able to fulfill its ambition to become of full-
complement global truck company, operating at the core of its value-creating system, as 
the different aspects of the manifestation of the organizational network picture have 
shown. However, another actor which was previously more peripheral to BT’s network 
picture became central in phase 3: Toyota, with its take-over of BT. Toyota was one of 
the companies that BT had turned to for worldwide counterbalanced truck as Toyota had 
the capabilities in terms of customer base, offering spread, and global reach BT needed to 
become a core player in the market. However, Toyota declined cooperation, while BT 
started to provide Toyota with warehouse trucks. The ownership situation of BT 
eventually meant that Toyota acquired BT. This was done with the integration of the 
customer networks of BT (Europe and US) and Toyota (Asia) in mind. Thus, BT now had 
a totally new dimension (Asia, especially Japan) added to its network picture. 
Furthermore, BT/Toyota had a clear top positioning in the global truck market, as well as 
in most niche areas, through a wide product and channel portfolio.  
However, the network picture manifestations show that a wide-ranging independence of 
BT remained with regard to its place within the network logic of the value-creating 
system. Toyota continuously refused counterbalanced truck deliveries to, or product 
system integration with, BT. This meant that BT continued and in fact increased its use of 
the Cesab brand, by introducing it to the US. Again, upstream interactions were of 
importance, especially in terms of changes in the systems and processes: because of the 
dominant position of BT/Toyota, efforts were made to develop more efficient interaction 
modes with suppliers (such as lead buyer systems; large volume supply structures by 
continent). This also spilled over into an integration of production systems between 
Toyota and BT. However, the organizational network picture shows that downstream 
customer interactions were not following this integration. A ‘two brands/two channels’ 
strategy was evident, resulting from the organizational divide which existed between 
Toyota’s middle management and BT. This was apparent, for example, with regard to the 
BT sales channels (made up mostly of dependent organizations) which Toyota believed 
would threaten its preferred sales network structure (i.e. independent dealers). While 
some internal system integration happened (such as cross-supplying and re-branding of 
offerings), this was not communicated to customers which still ‘faced’ two seemingly 
independent companies, exemplified in their different interaction channels and interaction 
modes, and also manifested through individual budgets of the companies.  
A Dimensional Model of Organizational Network Pictures 
Based on the case study of BT Industries, some (more or less) distinct themes of 
manifestation can be found. These themes are subsequently refined into dimensions and 
sub-dimensions (areas). Through using a framing and reframing technique (Chreim, 
2006; Gonos, 1977; Snow et al., 1986) efforts have been placed on finding ways in which 
network pictures are inscribed to guide actions within and between organizations. 
Reframing in turn focuses on how such guidance is altered (Palmer & Dunford, 1996) in 
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order to manifest changes during the organization’s development. In our case study this is 
illustrated through the four phases, which each mark distinct development steps of BT 
Industries. The case study was addressed with questions concerning in which aspect 
organizational network picture traces could be found, and also what consequences this 
had for the company. Our approach is an initial attempt to systematize these 
manifestations by analyzing traces they leave according to several dimensions and areas. 
In the following, a descriptive research method of organizational network pictures is 
introduced, analogously to a dimension-based concept of individual network pictures as 
introduced by Henneberg, Mouzas and Naudé (2006) and Ford and Ramos (2006; 2007).  
The model of organizational network pictures is based on two dimensions which are not 
fully independent of each other. Firstly, we investigate the morphology of the inscriptions 
and manifestations by ‘locating’ them within the organization. This dimension must not 
be understood as referring to a ‘physical’ location but is concerned with the aspect of the 
organizational entity in which the manifestation resides (e.g. this can also be a process, a 
textual description, a norm). Secondly, the consequences of organizational manifestations 
are delineated, i.e. what kind of priming or framing impact they have on networking 
activities. We use an adaptation of the activity-resource-actor model to incorporate the 
way inscriptions and manifestations impact on organizational networking (Håkansson & 
Snehota, 1995). We provide a methodological grid (the dimensional model) which 
captures elements of network picture inscriptions and manifestations. In the following, 
the manifold dimensions of the model are introduced, together with a discussion of the 
formative areas. 
Morphology of Manifestations 
Based on an analysis of our case study, we posit that inscriptions and manifestations of 
organizational network pictures are possible in the following areas: 
Systems: Hard systems (such as ICT) or soft systems (such as incentive systems) often 
implicitly set limits regarding the interaction partners. In the BT Industries case, systems 
appear in areas such as purchasing, where a lead buyer system was introduced to guide 
purchasing staff about procurement decisions. Systems may, however, appear also in 
other areas, such as that the system configuration of a CATI system used by a call-centre 
may only provide certain variables to the agent. An agent with knowledge regarding the 
‘value of a customer’ may vary interactions accordingly, while one without this 
knowledge will not be able to personalize the interaction. 
Processes: Systems may imply certain processes. Within the process, certain interaction 
parameter, or decision-rules are embedded. These may only make sense for certain 
marketing interaction partners or certain strategic interactions and therefore delineate 
certain acceptable managerial responses. In the case study, this could be exemplified by 
processes of integrated purchasing between BT and the other companies.  
Budgets: Networking focus or emphasis can be guided through budgets. While budget 
allocation is one of the main managerial decisions which follows strategic intent, it also 
contains some unexpected restrictions (e.g. with regard to the crowding out of options 
which were not visible at the time of the budget decision-making). Separate budgets 
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manifested that the various companies (BT, Raymond, Cesab and Toyota) continued as 
separate units also following the acquisitions. Budgets also played important roles when 
the companies considered different options: The acquisition of Raymond was a 
consequence of BT having a strong financial situation, where managers considered it 
important to find a way to invest the money. At the time of the acquisition of Cesab, 
monetary frames made it impossible for BT to acquire a strong actor in the 
counterbalanced truck segment, which made cooperation the main option. 
Strategy: Issues around how to segment supplier or customer markets, and subsequently 
where to target company resources immediately and directly impact on the networking 
activities and interactions which are prioritized (and those which are consequently de-
prioritized) (Henneberg et al., 2009). However, other strategic decision can also ‘contain’ 
network manifestations, e.g. decisions regarding joint ventures (Öberg et al., 2007). For 
instance, the acquisition of Raymond was a result of that BT had considered its position 
unsatisfying.  
Organization: How a company organizes itself is an expression not only of how it wants 
to internally transform resources but also of how it wants to interact with the outside 
world (the ‘sorting’ decision within exchange patterns; Alderson & Martin, 1965; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Clear organizational indicators of organizational network 
pictures can for example be found in Key Account Management structures. The 
introduction of International KAM was evidence that BT considered itself to be a global 
organization following the acquisition of Raymond. 
Influences and Consequences of Manifestations 
Along the second dimension of the research model of organizational network pictures, 
three distinct areas can be identified, based on an adaptation of the activity-resource-actor 
model used to describe and analyze dyadic and network interactions. 
Inclusion/exclusion of interactions partner: this refers to whether or not certain 
interaction links with partners are embedded in the organization (or more precisely, its 
morphology) to the exclusion of other potential interaction partners. This can be inscribed 
in preferred interaction partner lists/preferred supplier lists; sales people route planning; 
contractual agreements (e.g. exclusivity rights); or market and customer 
segmentation/targeting models. To exemplify this in the case study, the acquisition of 
Cesab meant that previous cooperation partners in the counterbalanced truck area were 
excluded. 
Impact on interaction mode: certain manifestations are prescribing an interaction mode 
with exchange partners, i.e. an underlying ‘rationale’ for this interaction is stipulated. 
This may include certain relational norms but also recommendations regarding non-
interactions. Examples of organizational manifestations which are impacting on 
interaction modes are Key Account Management/Key Supply Centre structures; treatment 
strategies as part of relational interaction systems like CRM; preferred channel interaction 
strategies; KPI-based incentives regarding certain behavior routines for touch-point 
agents and sales personnel; or marketing strategies regarding differentiation from 
competition. The introduction of international key account managers added an 
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organizational level in interacting with global customers, but also meant a centralization 
of sales. 
Allocation of resources: commitment of financial resources directly prescribes certain 
interactions with external exchange partners (see budget above). As such, budget 
distributions are showing commitment (or the lack of it) as well as a certain implied 
network structure regarding important exchange partners. However, other resource 
streams such as prioritized information gathering, external knowledge exchanges via joint 
innovation management, or employee recruitment or ‘outplacement’ (e.g. in professional 
services firms to generate new potential clients) give an indication of the organizational 
network picture. Separate marketing budget frames for the individual companies in the 
BT Industries case manifested the organizational structure of independent companies 
within the group. 
Using these two dimensions of morphology and consequences, an organizational network 
picture can be characterized as consisting of certain company-specific elements which 
can hold inscriptions of the implied network environment in which the focal business is 
operating and which impacts on its strategic options and its networking capability. The 
morphology and the consequences of manifestations therefore provide a descriptive five 
by three grid (inclusion/exclusion of interaction partners, interaction mode, and allocation 
of resources on the one hand,  systems, processes, budgets, strategy, and organization on 
the other) that can be used as the basis for a content analysis of organizations. It forms the 
basis of a ‘coding tree’ which provides access to a structured understanding of the 
organizational manifestations of network imprints and also their managerial 
consequences.  
Synthesis of Dimensional Model and Discussion 
Based on the dimensional model of organizational network pictures combining 
morphology, and influences and consequences of manifestations, this section returns to 
the case study through categorizing the descriptions of each phase according to the five 
by three grid. 
Phase 0 (see Table 1) was marked by BT considering strategic options as the company 
wanted to change its present position. Organizationally, through the KF ownership and 
BT’s geographical presence, certain actors were excluded from BT’s network, while at 
the same time BT benchmarked itself towards two European full-range suppliers, Linde 
and Jungheinrich. Interaction modes included cooperation arrangements with 
counterbalanced truck suppliers on specific markets, and a focus on service towards 
existing customers, while the present financial situation and BT’s wish to change its 
position meant that new interaction modes were considered. Resources, mainly 
represented by financial resources, were allocated in the direction of geographical 
expansion. 
Phase 1 (see Table 2) introduced new systems and processes with regard to suppliers. The 
acquisition of Raymond meant that BT clearly wanted to be seen as a global company, 
which was communicated in the company’s strategy and through the evaluation of 
suppliers on a global basis. Budget was directed towards finding common suppliers, 
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which in turn meant an exclusion of certain actors, while at the same time, Raymond and 
BT were allowed to work as independent companies towards customers. Interaction 
modes were not dramatically changed, but for the introduction of an international KAM 
organization to manifest the global presence. 
In phase 2 (as described in Table 3) the acquisition of Cesab meant that previous 
cooperation partners in the counterbalanced truck area were excluded, while at the same 
time the acquisition aimed to open up for new customers. Interaction modes between 
Cesab and BT were marked by BT’s aim to implement its purchasing process in Cesab 
and by the strategic combination of brands and products to manifest BT as a full-range 
supplier. As for allocation of resources, the acquisition meant that BT allocated financial 
resources to acquire Cesab. 
Phase 3 (see Table 4) meant that in several areas, BT continued as previously. Systems 
and organization largely remained as prior to the acquisition, also meaning that 
interaction modes and interaction partners continued as previously. The major change 
appeared in the area of purchasing, where a strategy focusing on per-continent purchasing 
was developed.  
Based on Table 1 to 4 it can be concluded that most traces of manifestations were found 
in the strategy area with an emphasis on inclusion/exclusion of actors and interaction 
mode. That the strategy dimension appears as important in all four phases may at least 
partly be the result of the ongoing changes of the case company including the 
acquisitions. Organizational aspects are mainly seen regarding how ownership affects 
inclusion and exclusion of actors, and how the group was organized following the 
acquisitions as a means to manifest common ownership or continued independence 
between companies. The organizational aspects would be expected to replicate the 
strategy dimension, but did not always do so, which is specifically evident regarding 
independence between companies. Systems appear in the same dimensions as 
organizational aspects and often were a way to manifest organizational aspects through 
e.g. systems of integrated activities. Processes may in turn appear as results of systems, 
but could also be seen as reactions to intended strategies, where processes consequently 
meant that strategies were not fulfilled. Traces of processes are most prevalent regarding 
the interaction modes with network parties, and secondly concerning inclusion/exclusion 
of actors. There are a limited number of examples concerning the budget dimension; 
when these appear they mainly concern allocation of resources and interaction mode, 
where financial resources are allocated for acquisitions, and where separate budgets allow 
for the companies to act independently. The allocation of financial resources and the 
separation of budgets mostly followed the organization and system aspects, while at the 
same time in some occasions worked against intended strategy. The reason for several 
aspects of organization, systems, processes, and budgets not complying with strategy was 
both found within the organizational set-up as well as in the interactions with business 
partners. This would indicate that the organizational network pictures are not merely 
results of top managers’ views, but adjusts to external circumstances and that also other 
parties (apart from top managers) within the organization impact the organizational 
network pictures. Such a reasoning would points to certain artifacts proceeding others.  
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The representation of the different dimensions and areas differ somewhat between the 
phases. In phase 0, i.e. before the acquisitions, several system traces were found, while 
we only found limited examples of processes. During the scope of the acquisitions, fewer 
traces of systems are found, while process traces are more evident. In the last phase (see 
Table 4) systems are once again more frequently represented, while process traces appear 
less often. An explanation for this would be that during the scope of the acquisitions, 
emphasis is put on change processes, while systems become more apparent once more 
permanent situations are reached. Budget is not very well represented in the case study, 
but for how it affected the interaction mode with suppliers and customers, and how 
financial resources were allocated for acquisitions, which was most evident before the 
acquisition of Raymond. It was only in the transition time between the acquisitions 
(phase 1 to 2) that traces of budget in the inclusion/exclusion dimension could be found. 
This could imply that the inclusion and exclusion of actors are temporary traces that in 
turn direct the interaction modes. As stated previously, the strategy dimension is the most 
frequently represented dimension in our case study. This is the situation in all four 
phases, where it is also evident that few traces of strategy are found in the allocation of 
resource-dimension. The organization dimension is fairly well-represented in all the 
phases and for all influence and consequence dimensions. As with strategy, few traces 
were found regarding allocation of resources, and the inclusion/exclusion of actors 
following the acquisitions merely mirror possible integration plans or objections thereto. 
In summary, certain dimensions are more connected to changes resulting in/from mergers 
and acquisitions, while others become evident during more stable conditions. As the BT 
case deals with a company in transition, strategy and processes aim primarily at changing 
the organizational network pictures, and thus are more prevalent in the particular case 
setting. 
Conclusion and Implications 
The concept of organizational network pictures was used in the case analysis by 
analyzing different facets of their manifestations by phases. Organizational network 
pictures represent the traces of managerial sense-making regarding the embedding 
business environment as an outcome of social interactions within the company. As such, 
organizational network pictures are an objectified meso-level construct of managerial 
activities. An initial dimensional model of organizational network pictures was developed 
to capture difference aspects of these traces. Some conclusions regarding the acquisition 
activities of BT in the period 1997-2004 can be drawn from the analysis using this 
dimensional model, as well as some comments on the concept itself and its 
operationalization can be made. 
Main Findings 
Starting with the analysis of the hectic acquisition activities at BT, it can be shown that 
from an early point onwards, the strategic orientation of BT as exemplified in the 
strategic manifestations was already fixated with a ‘wider’ network picture, while 
processes, systems, budgets, or organizational issues remained bound to ‘narrower’ 
network picture logic. BT saw itself on the periphery of a global market of trucks, based 
on full-offering customer demands, channel and supply-chain integration, and a shrinking 
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competitive landscape. Its specific starting point in terms of deep after-sales interactions 
based on dependent sales and service channels, with a focus on Europe and a niche 
positioning in warehouse trucks comprised of a much smaller number of actors, more 
limited interaction modes and resource ties than its ‘wider’ organizational network 
picture as envisaged in its strategic manifestations. Over the course of the different 
acquisitions, new players, interactions, systems, processes, and organizational aspects 
were one-by-one added and aligned with this wider network picture, in order to achieve 
finally a core positioning in the global truck network where the strategic network picture 
overlapped with the other aspects of network picture manifestations. This was achieved 
by including more customers (in the US via Raymond), more offering variety and supply-
chain system efficiency (via Cesab), and finally a truly global reach (multiple brands, 
channels, and the inclusion of Asia via Toyota). 
However, the different facets of network picture manifestations also clearly show that 
there are still frictions in existence, as well as contradictions within BT. The hope to 
become a ‘preferred supplier’ is an example of this: while on strategic level a consistent 
and integrated full-offering interaction with global key customers across continents is 
envisaged, this is contradicted by organizational manifestations (e.g. SBU organization 
by continent; different channel systems for BT and Toyota), by process manifestations 
(international KAM but brand-based interaction processes), and by system manifestations 
(no brand-crossing NPD). While these alignments along all dimensions of network 
picture manifestations exist to a somewhat larger degree in the area of supply-chain-
management (by global purchasing integration; best-practice roll-out across different 
SBUs; supplier consolidation and bundling efforts), they have not been achieved in 
downstream interactions.  
Analyzing the usefulness of the concept of organizational network pictures, the 
acquisition activities of BT show that certain aspects of the strategic intent inscribe 
themselves before the action itself has been enacted. This is especially true in terms of the 
strategic aspects of network picture manifestation: the ‘network definition’, the actor 
focus (e.g. in terms of important competitors), and the availability of options (the 
pressure to use funds). Thus, one can trace the success of the intended strategy in terms of 
its enactment by juxtaposing the different aspects of the organizational network picture 
construct. Internal contradictions and a lag of manifestations, e.g. in terms of processes or 
organizational structure, are indicators of potential shortfalls. Frictions and time lags 
between alignments of different aspects of organizational network pictures indicate that 
these are complex and multi-faceted. Difficulties as well as inconsistencies in managing 
and steering organizations surface when analyzing the network picture dimensions 
described. 
Applying the construct of organizational network pictures to our case study shows that 
while the concept and its facets can be clearly overlaid over the data, this works best for 
‘strategic’ manifestations and to some extent also for process and systems issues, as well 
as for the inclusion/exclusion of actors, and the interaction mode. Aspects of budget, as 
well as resource tie-related issues were more difficult to extract. This hints at the fact that 
these need more specific data sources, i.e. beyond a general case study description and 
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analysis of acquisition processes. Thus, case study information which covers these 
aspects may need to be collected specifically to ensure a rich data source, covering all 
aspect of network picture manifestations. Furthermore, as BT underwent a period of 
dramatic changes due to acquisition and merger activities in the case study period, the 
findings may not be typical in a wider context. Specifically changes instigated as a result 
will emphasize strategic aspects, while inscriptions related to day-to-day activities would 
not be as easily be traceable or crowded out.   
Theoretical Implications 
Literature on business networks has focused foremost on the macro-level of interacting 
companies in business networks. More recently, network pictures as manager’s sense-
making devices have attracted several researchers’ attention. The dimensional model of 
organizational network pictures outlined in this paper is a means to address the chasm 
between individually held network pictures and network interaction (Henneberg et al., 
2010). This means that we create a link between the micro- and the macro-level of 
business market analyses, in that we connect individuals’ sense-making with activities on 
a network level. We introduce the meso-level as level of analysis, where focus is on the 
individual company and processes therein that manifest and direct activities. The 
dimensional model introduced in this paper becomes a means to capture tangible traces of 
organizational network pictures. It also provides evidence of how sense-making of 
individuals are inscribed in organizational artifacts. These in turn aim to guide the 
company’s networking activities. 
While the paper focuses on such inscriptions, it does not provide insights into how 
subjective sense-making is transformed into such artifacts and further to networking 
activities (Henneberg et al., 2010). The testing of the model indicates that there may be 
discrepancies between strategic intentions and inscriptions in organizational structures, 
processes, and the like. This suggests that organizational inscriptions do not just simply 
connect individual network pictures and companies’ networking activities. Instead, the 
transition of individual network pictures into organizational inscriptions and further to 
networking activities of the company is a process of social interaction involving critical 
interpretations, adaptations, and changes. These social interactions in turn are indirectly 
framed or are directly the result of such inscriptions. Issues around control and power, but 
also sensitivity to other parties’ networking activities and perception, are factors to 
consider when studying how organizational artifacts transfer from individual and 
subjective network pictures to networking activities.  
Inscriptions are expected to differ between various types of firms (independently of 
differences of the underlying subjective network pictures). The more centralized the 
organization, the more rigid are the organizational network pictures with the aim to steer 
networking activities, while decentralized organizations (such as BT) are hypothesized to 
show larger discrepancies with regard to artifacts, due to the fact that network pictures are 
created through manifold interactions with more actors on various organizational levels 
and these network pictures need in turn to be amalgamated into organizational network 
pictures (Mouzas et al., 2008). 
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For further research it would be important to understand how subjective network pictures 
build up to organizational manifestations, and further how organizational manifestations 
are interpreted into networking activities. We further suggest a dimensional model as a 
device for investigating the way companies are embedded in a network of interacting 
organizations, resulting in strategic decisions about complex strategic marketing 
activities. Furthermore, future research needs to focus on the tensions and time lags in 
organizational network pictures. Such studies could include linking these organizational 
artifacts to individual network pictures to analyze why discrepancies appear, but linking 
them to networking activities to explore  what consequences organizational network 
pictures have for the company’s networking. 
Managerial Implications 
The paper demonstrated that manifestations of managerial cognition function as 
guidelines for a company’s networking activities. This implies that they create a link 
between managers’ interactive sense-making and activities of the company. In doing so, 
it is imperative that manifestations actually reflect managers’ cognition and guide 
network activities. For managers it is, hence, of key importance to ascertain that such 
manifestations actually inscribe the organization’s network picture. The introduced 
dimensional model may provide useful help to identify areas of inscriptions, and, thereby, 
the model functions as a planning and follow-up tool.  
The analysis of our case study revealed that there were discrepancies between 
inscriptions in the various dimensions. For managers, it would be important to ensure that 
various manifestations within the organization converge rather than diverge. Reasons for 
discrepancies, including time lags, would need to be analyzed by managers in order to 
improve processes within organizations, but also to understand that is not merely the top 
managers’ view on the company’s network that drives company activities.  
For managers, sophisticated artifacts may be a means to steer an organization, without 
individuals in the organization feeling directly controlled or steered. This could include 
implementations of specific organizational structures to promote a certain way to interact 
with external parties. While inscriptions aim to guide networking activities, there is thus a 
freedom in management style regarding appropriate ways to use such devices and make 
the organization act in a certain manner.  
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Table 1: Organizational Manifestations of Network Pictures, BT Phase 0 
  Phase 0 (BT prior to 1997)       
  System Process  Budget Strategy Organization 
Inclusion/ 
exclusion 
  Limited presence on 
the US market and 
difficulty grow there via 
present representation 
(subsidiary Prime 
Mover) 
Perception of customers 
having global purchasing 
processes which are not 
matched by BT 
  Targeting strategy 
focused on consumer 
goods customers (in 
comparison to some 
main competitors such 
as Kalmar which target 
process industry 
customers) 
Minor player in the US 
via Prime Mover 
  Distribution systems to provide counter-
balanced trucks only 
available to BT in a 
small number of 
countries (Sweden and 
UK via Clark 
cooperation) 
    BT views itself as a 
'service company' with 
attached production 
division in the network 
Organizational 
cooperation with other 
KF-owned customers; 
exclusion of interactions 
with KF competitors 
  Industry logic of systems as based on 
warehouse trucks for 
consumer goods 
companies; and 
counterbalanced trucks 
for process industry 
    Strategic focus on two 
main competitors in 
Europe: Jungheinrich 
and Linde (both seen by 
BT as full-range 
suppliers of 
counterbalance and 
warehouse truck, thus 
targeting process and 
consumer goods 
industry) 
Emphasis on after-sales 
service organization 
        Competitor landscape is shrinking due to 
acquisitions by main 
players; brand 
landscape also shrinking 
due to brand culls 
  
        Strategic intent: either becoming a European 
full-range supplier, or a 
global warehouse truck 
nicher  
  
Interaction 
mode 
  Closer interactions with 
US customers via 
proprietary system 
perceived to be 
necessary 
Aggressive market 
behavior ('corporate 
raids') towards Raymond 
places it in the 
perception of the 
network as an 
acquisition target' 
After sales interactions 
contribute 50% of 
turnover; rental 
interactions contribute 
another 20% 
Operations in the US 
would mean for BT that 
they are now perceived 
as a 'national' interaction 
partner 
Large number of wholly 
or partly owned service 
and sales organizations 
as semi-independent 
service organizations 
      Cash reserves at BT made aggressive 
acquisition search 
possible 
Tackling Raymond and 
Crown as the main US 
competitors head-on as 
a means of expanding 
business 
Cooperation with 
counterbalanced truck 
providers on certain 
markets (Clark) 
        Competition and cooperation as two-
pronged interaction 
approach, e.g. combi-
truck collaboration with 
Raymond 
  
        Long-term sales interaction with 
customers via after-sales 
as favorite strategic 
interaction model 
  
Allocation 
of 
resource 
      BT had no debts since 
end of 1997. Therefore, 
investment was 'needed' 
and resources were 
earmarked for this 
purpose 
Strategic profitability aim 
was not achievable via 
organic growth and 
therefore focused on 
acquire resource 
availability 
Physical production 
investment focus in 
Sweden, US, and 
Canada 
          BT becoming a peripheral business 
within the ownership 
organization of KF 
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Table 2: Organizational Manifestations of Network Pictures, BT Phase 1 
  Phase 1 (BT after acquisition of Raymond: 1997-1999)  
  System Process  Budget Strategy Organization 
Inclusion/ 
exclusion 
  New increased size and 
position of BT leads to 
expectation of 
becoming 'preferred 
supplier' to key 
customers 
Inclusion of Raymond 
suppliers into supply 
chain 
Inclusion of Raymond 
supplier with 
renegotiations to obtain 
better prices  
Geographical expansion into 
dominant niche through 
warehouse trucks via 
Raymond acquisition 
  
  PrimeMover systems (proprietary to BT) 
sidelined by Raymond 
    BT's self-perspective as No. 
1 in world market of 
warehouse trucks 
(previously saw itself as No. 
3 in Europe) 
  
        Strategic decision not to make Raymond customers 
aware of the new link with 
BT; the same happened in 
some European countries 
where BT customers were 
not informed about 
Raymond's integration 
  
        Strategic focus after acquisition on expanding BT 
customer base (and not 
creating globally integrated 
customer base) 
  
        Perceived next challenge in network was linked to 
becoming a truly global 
player by satisfying all 
customer demands, i.e. by 
having counterbalance and 
warehouse trucks all over 
the world. First priority: to 
become full range supplier 
in Europe 
  
Interaction 
mode 
  Expectation that 'global 
interaction systems' are 
now necessary for BT 
Initial attempt (later 
abandoned) to provide 
product and component 
coordination with 
Raymond (later, BT and 
Raymond became again 
independent offerings) 
Price renegotiations with 
Raymond suppliers; 
general supply-chain 
renegotiations of 
framework agreements 
Strategic aim to become a 
'preferred supplier' with key 
customers 
Organizational material 
flow not the main 
consideration for 
Raymond acquisition, 
but customer locations 
with the necessary 
global organizational 
reach for suppliers 
  Otherwise, interaction systems did not 
dramatically change 
No 'cross-marketing' of 
SBU offerings allowed 
(especially not between 
US and Europe) 
General purchasing 
interactions with supply-
chain became more 
price focused 
Perceived interaction 
demand of customers as 
'global' 
No organizational 
integration of Raymond 
due to its 'independent' 
success  
    Expectation that new 'key supplier' 
relationships will develop 
Raymond as a new part 
of BT was the more 
profitable and faster 
growing company 
Initial attempt to provide 
integrated interaction by 
product/component 
coordination (later 
abandoned and BT and 
Raymond SBU strategy 
became reinstated) 
BT was meant to be the 
integrating link between 
organizational regions 
    Emphasis on ergonomics and quality 
issues in Europe, and on 
price in the US 
 Customer interactions did 
not change due to the fact 
that no customer handling 
integration between 
Raymond and BT was 
envisaged 
International KAMs 
introduced as new layer 
in BTs organization 
    Integration attempts seen to have failed due 
to Raymond's resistance 
to process alignment 
  Customer interactions were 
expected to change due to 
size/position of BT, 
providing them with 
'preferred supplier' status 
Generally perceived 
different 'cultures' 
between Raymond and 
BT organizations 
       Purchasing interactions and relationships were redefined 
as part of strategic focus of 
BT after acquisition 
  
        Main logic of network associated with ergonomics 
and quality of offering 
considerations in Europe, 
and with price in the US 
  
          Based on continent-based understanding of network 
logic, marketing and R&D 
networking activities 
different 
  
Allocation 
of 
resource 
 Marketing/product 
systems for BT and 
Raymond had separate 
resource funds 
Raymond becomes 
dominant brand and 
sales channel for US 
SBU (Prime Mover was 
integrated into 
Raymond) 
Raymond provide very 
positive resource flow 
but is seen by BT more 
as a strategic investment  
Resource allocation based 
on quality considerations in 
Europe, and on price in the 
US  
Resource re-allocation in 
the US from old BT 
business to Raymond 
SBU in the US 
        Separate strategic NPD budgets    
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Table 3: Organizational Manifestations of Network Pictures, BT Phase 2 
  Phase 2 (BT after acquisition of Cesab: 1999-2000) 
  System Process  Budget Strategy Organization 
Inclusion/ 
exclusion 
  System development to 
deal with 
counterbalanced and 
warehouse trucks 
Toyota refused to 
provide counterbalanced 
trucks to BT; BT decided 
to provide Toyota with 
warehouse trucks 
anyway 
KF was not profitable 
and therefore wanted to 
exclude non-core 
activities from its 
portfolio, including BT 
Perception by BT that the 
customer network of the 
material-handling industry 
demand a full complement 
of trucks from one supplier 
Decision to acquire 
organizational 
supplement in the form of 
Cesab to become a full 
offering provider was 
preferred to other 
organizational networking 
alternative (e.g. 
cooperation approaches 
by Toyota and by Clark 
had been made) 
    Fear by BT that Cesab could cease its previous 
cooperation and process 
integration with BT via 
being acquired by 
competitor 
KF divested BT shares, 
thus BT was seen to be 
for sale 
Previously, BT SBU Europe 
worked in this area via own 
production capabilities and 
as distributor of 
counterbalanced trucks for 
other companies (Hyster, 
Clark, Dockstocker) 
  
    Via acquisition of Cesab cooperation with Clark 
and Hyster is ended 
  Strategic intent of Cesab 
acquisition based on 
complementing offering 
portfolio by bringing 
counterbalanced truck 
production in house (and 
therefore open the BT 
network to new customers 
and segments) 
  
       Perception by BT that Linde and Jungheinrich have 
already made that step to a 
full-offering provider 
(through Steinbock and 
STILL acquisitions) 
  
Interaction 
mode 
    BT tried to 'educate' 
Cesab about purchasing 
process to align efforts 
  Integration of branding, e.g. 
BT brand/logo was used on 
Cesab counterbalanced 
truck (except for Italy and 
other countries where 
Cesab survived as a brand) 
Cooperation main option 
but failed to find 
cooperation partner for 
counterbalanced trucks. 
Organizational acquisition 
became preferred to other 
organizational interaction 
modes/networking 
solutions 
        Further brand reduction by BT trucks partially replacing 
Clark and Hyster trucks 
which were previously 
distributed via BT 
Independent sales 
organization of Cesab 
(dealers) are kept 
        Some countries experience customers having to choose 
between BT and Cesab 
trucks competitively as both 
are available through 
different selling channels 
  
          Purchasing relationships with Cesab suppliers were 
redefined through 
dissemination of 'best-
practice' BT approach to 
supplier interactions 
  
Allocation 
of 
resource 
 Cesab with own 
budgets for sales 
systems and sales 
management through 
independent dealers 
Two-step process of 
acquiring Cesab 
    Board of Cesab replaced 
with primarily BT people 
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Table 4: Organizational Manifestations of Network Pictures, BT Phase 3 
  Phase 3 (BT after take-over by Toyota: 2000-2004)  
  System Process  Budget Strategy Organization 
Inclusion/ 
exclusion 
  Due to Toyota 
continuously refusing to 
provide BT with 
counterbalanced trucks, 
BT continues with 
Cesab in Europe on 
systems level; Cesab 
trucks are also 
introduced in the US 
    Toyota acquisition of BT 
focused on incorporating 
existing BT customer 
networks in warehouse 
trucks, especially those in 
the US and Europe 
Toyota middle 
management opposed 
integration of BT by, for 
example, shared product 
sales channels, due to a 
perceived negative 
impact on the existing 
Toyota distribution 
network. Therefore, no 
organizational integration 
happened 
        Toyota focused on strategic market share target in a 
global market for trucks 
  
        BT clearly preferred Toyota as a buyer due to market 
synergies and perceived 
continuous independence, 
compared to alternative 
take-over attempts/bidders 
which were in the market 
  
Interaction 
mode 
  Lead buyer' system to 
disseminate best-
practice purchasing 
between SBUs and 
sub-brands 
Introduction of best-
practice processes for 
purchasing 
  Purchasing modes are 
redefined by SBU (i.e. 
continents) by identifying 
mutual suppliers of BT and 
Toyota and consolidation 
into large volume supply 
interactions 
BT and Toyota sales 
channels remained 
organizationally separate, 
especially in Europe 
  Integration of systems between BT and Toyota 
only by continents 
Two independent 
customer interaction 
processes and channels 
by brand 
  Introduction of a 'lead buyer' 
concept, based on the 
combined experiences of 
BT, Toyota, and Cesab 
BT continues with owned 
sales organizations, while 
Toyota uses independent 
dealerships 
  Toyota production system used at BT's 
production plants 
    Customer interactions based 
on a two brand strategy: 
Toyota and BT (internal 
slogan: Two brands, two 
channels), implying a 
desired intra-group 
competition 
However, cross-supplying 
was made without 
allowing the customers to 
realize this  
          Toyota aims at implementing (learning) BTs 
after-sales 
Second integration wave 
meant centralized 
management for Europe 
in Brussels 
Allocation 
of 
resource 
  BT and Toyota brands 
and channels with 
quasi-independent 
systems and system 
budgets 
    BT delivering trucks to 
Toyota but not the other way 
around with budget 
imbalance and transfer 
costing implications 
  
 
